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A GLASS HALF FULL: CORPORATE AND STATE RESPONSIBILITIES 
UNDER ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS DURING THE ON-GOING 
EUROPEAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Jernej Letnar Černič* 
INTRODUCTION 
On the eve of the financial crisis in 2007, Juan Carlos decided to buy a flat in the Madrid quarter of 
Princesa for 260,000 EUR.
1
  At that time, he was earning 1,100 EUR per month.
2
  However, the bank that 
approved his credit application to buy the flat set the monthly fee at 1,300 EUR.
3
  In order to meet his financial 
obligations, he had to rent the flat out.
4
  Shortly afterwards, he lost his job, was asked to repay the credit, fell ill, 
spent two months in the hospital, and became immobilized.
5
  After he returned home from the hospital, the bank 
attempted to evict him from the flat.
6
  Despite various attempts to try to renegotiate the loan contract and fight 
the eviction, the bank seized the flat and evicted him.
7
  This case illustrates the difficulties ordinary people face 
when they find themselves in a fragile situation during times of economic crisis.  The Court of Justice of the 
European Union recognized such state of affairs in the case C-415/11 Mohamed Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, noting, 
[T]he Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive precludes national legislation, such as 
the Spanish legislation at issue, which does not allow the court hearing the declaratory 
proceedings—that is, the proceedings seeking a declaration that a term is unfair—to adopt 
interim measures, in particular, the staying of the enforcement proceedings, where they are 




The European economic crisis has been so severe that it has affected nearly everyone.  “From Lisbon 
through Sevilla and Ljubljana to Athens and Nicosia, the Eastern and Southern European countries have been in 
recent years facing the negative consequences of the economic crisis and structural reforms.”
9
  “[T]he level of 
protection of social and economic rights has been rapidly declining”
10
 and there exists growing evidence that the 
economic and public debt crises of Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain have 
                                                          
* Assistant Professor of Law, Graduate School of Government and European Studies  
1 Alvaro de Cózar & Monica Ceberio, El Trauma, EN LA CALLE, http://elpais.com/especiales/2013/desahucios/el-
trauma.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2014). 
2 Id. 





8 Press Release, Court of Justice of the European Union, Spanish Legislation Infringes EU Law to the Extent that it 
Precludes the Court which has Jurisdiction to Declare Unfair a Term of Loan Agreement Relating to Immovable Prop. from 
Staying the Mortg. Enforcement Proceedings Initiated Separately (Mar. 14, 2013), available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2013-03/cp130030en.pdf.  See Sara Iglesias Sánchez, Unfair Terms 
in Mortgage Loans and Protection of Housing in Times of Economic Crisis: Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 51 COMMON MKT. L. 
REV. 955, 955 (2014). 





directly undermined the level of socioeconomic rights individuals enjoy in those countries.
11
  Reduction in 
government spending has caused a decrease in the level of protection of economic and social rights such as the 
right to social security, health care, education, housing, food, and water.
12
  The economic crises have affected 
the everyday lives of ordinary people at both the micro and macro levels.  For instance, the European 
Commission noted that “groups already at a heightened risk of poverty, such as young adults, children[,] and to 
some extent migrants, are now experiencing an even worse situation.”
13
  A young family in Spain, for example, 
can no longer repay its housing loan and can therefore quickly find itself homeless.  A former Greek public 
employee can no longer access state health insurance, as he has no income.  A Portuguese student cannot enroll 
at a public university due to increased tuition fees.  Furthermore, one cannot forget the almost biblical numbers 
of people seeking asylum who are suffering in reception centers in Athens, Lampadusa, and Malta.  Such cases 
leave no one indifferent.  The Eurobarometer reported that “[f]inancially vulnerable Europeans report feeling 
left out of society far more often than respondents as a whole.  While 16 % of Europeans overall feel excluded, 
around a third of ‘poor’ Europeans feel this way.”
14
  Margot Salmon argues that 
Europe’s elite failed to see the Eurozone crisis, and the responses to it, not only as a financial and 
economic issue, but also a human one.  They failed to acknowledge that stabilizing economies 
through austerity measures at best secures socio-economic rights only indirectly and tenuously 
and, at worst, violates them egregiously.  Decades of experience from elsewhere in the world on 
the human costs of structural adjustment should inform current decision-making, as should the 
experience of the impunity with which international organizations function when it comes to the 
harm to human rights caused by their policies.  The people of Greece were treated as if 




At first glance, it seems as if nothing has changed in the past few years.  Shopping centers in most European 
countries continue to be filled, most companies continue to operate smoothly, the trains continue to run, 
teaching is taking place undisturbed at the universities, and the theatres continue to operate.  The key question 
that has developed in recent years is whether the current situation is just the calm before the storm.  It would be 
wrong to hold only Southern European countries responsible for the apparent impasse in the current situation.  A 
fraction of the responsibility should also be placed on successful Northern European countries, which until now 
                                                          
11 See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Fundamental Rights: Challenges and Achievements in 
2012, at 11–38 (2013), available at http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/annual-report-2012_en.pdf.  See also International 
Labour Organization, World Social Protection Report 2014/15: Building Economic Recovery, Inclusive Development and 
Social Justice, at 2 (2014), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_245201.pdf. 
12 See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, supra note 11, at 11–38. 
13 Press Release, European Union, Comm’n Presents the 2012 'Emp’t and Soc. Devs. in Eur.' Review (Dec. 21, 
2012), available at http://europa.eu/newsroom/calendar/event/419057/2012-employment-and-social-developments-in-
europe-review. 
14  Poverty and Social Exclusion Report, at 52 (Dec. 2010), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_355_en.pdf. 





have been unable to find long-term solutions to stabilize their single currency.
16
  Delaying problem solving has 
never been a solution and never will be.  The crisis is also intensifying due to both the creditor and debtor 
countries avoiding taking responsibility.  At the same time, such policies are accompanied by populist politics 
that reject public saving, although it is more than clear that excessive borrowing leads to the collapse of the 
domestic economies, and in particular to a gradual loss of national sovereignty.  The following table illustrates 
the unemployment rate in the EU member states: 
 
Figure 1: Unemployment rates in EU member states
17
 
An economic crisis can undermine a state’s financial ability to fully implement even the reasonable 
minimum core of economic and social rights of its population.  If “a state is obliged to repay its sovereign debt” 
to private corporations, international organizations, or other states, “it will be less financially capable [to] 
provid[e] the reasonable minimum core of economic and social rights.”
18
  “Several states spend large 
proportions of their annual revenue repaying sovereign debt.”
19
  This is exemplified by “current and former 
totalitarian regimes, whose governments often take out vast financial [] loans to finance their military activities, 
                                                          
16 See Federico Fabbrini, The Fiscal Compact, the “Golden Rule,” and the Paradox of European Federalism, 36 
B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 1–4 (2013). 
17 Javier Diaz-Giminez, The Future of Spain Economic Growth: The Elasticity of Employment, ECONOMICS (Mar. 
6, 2014), http://blog.iese.edu/economics/2014/03/06/the-future-of-spain-economic-growth-the-elasticity-of-employment/. 
18 Jernej Letnar Černič, Making Sovereign Financing and Human Rights Work, RIGHTINGFINANCE (Oct. 16, 2014), 
http://www.rightingfinance.org/?p=1020.  See M. Dowell-Jones & D. Kinley, Minding the Gap: Global Finance and Human 
Rights, 25 ETHICS AND INT’L AFFAIRS 184, 191 (2011). 
19 Černič, supra note 18.  
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exuberant lifestyles[, or] imposed economic policies against the majority's interests.”
20
  Overall, “states . . . are 
obliged to uphold [an] individual’s . . . [economic and social] rights in the sovereign financing context.”
21
 
However, despite the growing attention paid to economic crises, poor public and private governance, and 
mismanagement of public funds, there has been little examination of the impact economic crises have on the 
enjoyment of socioeconomic rights.  Even though it is pertinent, “not much has so far been written on the 
relationship between [an economic crisis] and human rights,” particularly from the perspective of human rights 
law.
22
  “The majority of literature tends to focus on either human rights” or economic crises as separate notions, 
and “specific kinds of lenders, financial instruments[,] or human rights abuses rather than studying common 
features of the link between [crises and socioeconomic crises] generally.”
23
  This article therefore examines the 
relationship between socioeconomic rights and an economic crisis from the perspective of the human rights 
obligations of states, and attempts to enhance the discussion on how an economic crisis and socioeconomic 
rights can be adequately addressed.  Further, this article examines the implementation of socioeconomic rights 
in times of European economic and social crisis and asks one main question: Do corporations and territorial 
states have obligations to maintain standards of socioeconomic rights during an economic crisis? 
The rest of this article is dedicated to examining corporate and state obligations concerning economic and 
social rights.  It will endeavor to examine the breadth of these obligations and to resolve whether these 
obligations remain unchanged in the times of a European economic crisis.  The article will be split into seven 
sections.  Section II discusses the implementation of economic and social rights during the economic and social 
crisis in Europe.  Section III analyzes the nature and scope of corporate responsibilities under socioeconomic 
rights.  Section IV discusses state obligations concerning economic and social rights and their core in three 
steps: first, by discussing and analyzing the fundamentals and legal nature of the state obligations; second, by 
examining the case law of the European Court of Human Rights; and third by studying the practice of the 
                                                          
20 Id.  See S. Michalowski & J.P. Bohoslavsky, Ius Cogens, Transtional Justice and Other Trends of the Debate on 
Odious Debts: A Response to the World Banks Discussion Paper on Odious Debts, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 61, 81 
(2009); J.P. Bohoslavsky & V. Opgenhaffen, The Past and Present of Corporate Complicity: Financing the Argentinean 
Dictatorship, 23 HARV. HUM. RTS.  J. 157, 204 (2010). 
21 Černič, supra note 18.  The Castan Centre of Human Rights notes that “it does not follow that from additional 
sites of responsibility comes a corresponding reduction of the State’s liability in respect of human rights protection and 
promotion.”  RACHEL  CHAMBERS, THE CASTAN CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, RESPONSIBILITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS AND RELATED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES WITH REGARDS TO HUMAN RIGHTS 2, available at 
http://www.law.monash.edu.au/castancentre/policywork/ohchr-sub-final.pdf. 
22 Jernej Letnar Černič, Placing Human Rights at the Centre of Sovereign Financing, in MAKING SOVEREIGN 
FINANCING AND HUMAN RIGHTS WORK 1, 4 (Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Jernej Letnar Černič eds., 2014).  See, e.g., C. Raj 
Kumar, Human Rights Crisis of Public Health Policy: Comparative Perspectives on the Protection and Promotion of 
Economic and Social Rights, 52 INDIAN J. INT. L. 351, 351 (2012); Ignazio Saiz, Rights in Recession? Challenges for 
Economic and Social Rights Enforcement in Times of Crisis, 1 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 277, 277 (2009); Rachael Lorna 
Johnstone & Aðalheiður Ámundadóttir, Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Iceland's Financial Crisis, 3 
Y.B. POLAR L. 455, 455 (2011). 
23 Černič, supra note 22, at 4. 
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European Committee on Social Rights.  Section V addresses the extraterritorial obligations of the home states of 
corporations, and Section VI offers predictions.  Based on the preceding analyses, the conclusion in Section VII 
determines the benefit of corporate and territorial state obligations concerning economic and social rights and 
how they could be better realized in the future.  
 
I. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CRISIS IN EUROPE 
In past decades, a majority of states have encountered difficulties in securing socioeconomic rights.  The 
economic crisis and “[t]he repayment of public debt directly affect[] individuals' enjoyment of human rights, 
particularly economic and social rights.”
24
  When the European Union and other international organizations, 
such as the International Monetary Fund, set conditions for granting further loans to Eastern and Southern 
European countries, they often forgot the obligations of those states to respect, protect, and fulfill the economic 
and social rights of ordinary people.
25
  In recent decades, states have borrowed funds directly from other 
countries, international organizations, and private financial funds.
26
  Such loans have often allowed for 
excessive government spending, poor public resources management, and corruption.
27
  Within the banking 
sector of Eastern and Southern Europe, excessive spending and poor management has brought those countries to 
the brink of fiscal collapse.
28
  This has led a number of individuals in those countries to struggle daily to provide 
for their families.   
Previous research illustrates that heavily indebted states are less likely to ensure the adequate 
level of protections of economic and social rights.  Further, there exists growing evidence 
from the [economic] crises of Southern Europe that suggests that the repayment of sovereign 
debt directly undermines the level of economic and social rights.  In Particular, [] examples of 
Greece, Portugal, and Spain illustrate how damaging an effect restructuring of [public] debt 




Year Greece Italy Slovenia Spain Portugal  
2012 157.2 127.0 54.4 86.0  124.1 
2013 175.1 132.6 71.7 93.9 129.0 
                                                          
24 Jernej Letnar Černič, Sovereign Financing and Corporate Responsibility for Economic and Social Rights, in 
MAKING SOVEREIGN FINANCING AND HUMAN RIGHTS WORK 139, 144 (Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Jernej Letnar Černič eds., 
2014). 
25 See JOANNA DREGER, BRUGES EUROPEAN ECON. POL’Y BRIEFING, WHY IS SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING A 
CHALLENGE? THE CASE OF GREECE 11, (2012); TERESA CAVERO & KRISHNA POINASAMY, OXFAM INT’L, A CAUTIONARY TALE 
– THE TRUE COST OF AUSTERITY AND INEQUALITY IN EUROPE 9, (2013). 
26 DREGER, supra note 25, at 11. 
27 See Felipe Gómez Isa, The Reversibility of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Crisis Contexts 4 (Comité 
Evaluador de los Working Papers, Working Paper No. 1, 2011). 
28 See DREGER, supra note 25, at 25; Johnstone & Ámundadóttir, supra note 22, at 467.  
29 Černič, supra note 24, at 144. 
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2014 177.2 135.2 80.4 100.2 126.7 
2015 172.4 133.9 81.3 103.8 124.8 
 




Table 1 illustrates that borrowing has exponentially increased in recent years within problematic European 
countries.
31
  Therefore, most stakeholders agree that it is necessary to limit public expenditures and include 
fiscal rules into national constitutions.
32
  The stability of public finances is necessary for a balanced budget, a 
legal basis for limiting public borrowing, and for establishing an effective and robust monitoring mechanism for 
the implementation of both rules.  Thus, it is necessary for a state to ensure that its public finances are balanced.  
It seems undisputed that a written constitution is the principle of fiscal stability and discipline.  For instance, 
Figure 2 illustrates the changes from 2011 to 2012 concerning people at risk of poverty or social exclusion in the 
European Union.
33





                                                          
30 Directorate Gen. of Econ. and Fin. Affairs (EFCIN), Statistical Annex of European Economy, at 184 (2014), 
available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2014/pdf/2014_05_05_stat_annex_en.pdf. 
31 See id. 
32 Andrea Schaechter, Tidiane Kinda, Nina Budina & Anke Weber, Fiscal Rules in Response to the Crisis—
Toward the “Next-Generation” Rules. A New Dataset 17–22, 26–27 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper WP/12/187, 
2012).  
33  People at Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion, EUROSTAT (2014), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/People_at_risk_of_poverty_or_social_exclusion (last updated Oct. 31, 2014).  
34 See id. 
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Figure 2: People at Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion in the European Union
35
 
A reasonable limitation on borrowing during times of deep economic crisis is needed for a state to continue 
to ensure socioeconomic rights.  Imposing reasonable, binding limits on public borrowing can contribute to the 
stabilization of public finances, which could renew confidence in financial institutions and rating agencies.  In 
this context, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR) observed in 
their 2012 Concluding Observations on Spain that the implementation of economic and social rights “[has] been 
reduced as a result of the austerity measures”
36
 and expressed concern that “one in four minors is living below 
the poverty line.”
37
  In addition, “pensions are in many cases below subsistence level, so that pensioners are at 
risk of falling into poverty.”
38
  Moreover, “the situation of individuals and families who find themselves 
overwhelmed by housing costs”
39
 are affected by “the regressive measures adopted by the State party that 
increase[s] university tuition fees.”
40
  Therefore, the CECSR asked Spanish authorities to ensure that “all the 
austerity measures adopted reflect the minimum core content of all the Covenant rights and that it take all 
appropriate measures to protect that core content under any circumstances, especially for disadvantaged and 
marginalized individuals and groups.”
41
  Similarly, the CESCR noted in the 2012 Concluding Observations on 
Bulgaria that it  
[I]s concerned, particularly in the context of the economic and financial crisis, about the 
recent rise in unemployment and long-term unemployment rates, which negatively affect the 
population of the State party, especially young persons, immigrants, Roma persons and 
persons with disabilities, and increases their vulnerability in violation of their rights set out in 
the Covenant.
42
   
Further, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) observed in its 
2013 Concluding Observations on Greece that “the current financial and economic crisis and measures taken by 
the [s]tate party to address it within the framework of the policies designed in cooperation with the European 
                                                          
35 Id. 
36  ESCOR, CESCR, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the 
Covenant, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/ESP/CO/5 (June 6, 2012).  
37 Id. ¶ 17. 
38 Id. ¶ 20. 
39 Id. ¶ 21. 
40 Id. ¶ 28. 
41 Id. ¶ 8. See Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Impact of Austerity Measures on the Enjoyment of 
Human Rights,  
 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Poverty/Pages/ImpactofausteritymeasuresontheenjoymentHR.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 
2015). 
42 ESCOR, CESCR, Concluding Observations on the Combined Fourth and Fifth Reports of Bulgaria, Adopted by 
the Committee at its Forty-ninth Session, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/BGR/CO/4-5 (Nov. 30, 2012). 
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Union institutions and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are having detrimental effects on women in all 
spheres of life.”
43
  The Committee further observed that  
Due to the seriousness of the situation and lack of any gender-sensitive approach to the 
current crisis policy within the [s]tate party, the Committee recommends that all important 
policymakers in Greece, including the European Union institutions and the IMF, cooperate in 
setting up an observatory to fully evaluate the impact on women of the many measures taken 
during the economic and financial crisis.  Furthermore, a comprehensive gender equality 
policy should be developed in order to respond to the crisis and make sure that the obligations 
under the Convention and the aim and spirit of the Treaty of the functioning of the European 
Union, which requires that in “all its activities the Union shall aim to eliminate inequalities, 





The foregoing pronouncements are illustrative of any state attempting to restructure its 
growing sovereign debt[,] caused by poor public and private sector management, at the 
expense of economic and social rights.  In this way, the public resources available for social 
expenditure decline substantially[, which] can lead to a decrease in the level of protection of 
economic and social rights. As a consequence, states cannot provide equal level access to 
health care, social housing, water, and food.  Access to university education is thereafter often 
subjected to increasing tuition fees, whereas there are in primary and secondary education 
more pupils per class.
45
   
 
In conclusion, it has been established that the enjoyment, or lack thereof, of economic and social rights is 




II.  CORPORATE OBLIGATIONS TO OBSERVE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
The financial corporate sector has played a significant role in the European economic and financial crisis.
47
  
Because of its involvement, it has contributed to the never-ending social crisis in the countries of Southern 
Europe.  In countries such as Greece, Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain, governments were left 
with no choice but to bail out doomed state-owned and privately owned banks.
48
  In Slovenia and several other 
countries, major state-owned banks were giving out so-called bad loans, or loans without guarantees.
49
  In the 
case of Slovenia, this forced the Slovenian government to produce several billions of Euros in losses, all to be 
                                                          
43 Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women [CEDAW], Concluding Observations on the 
Seventh Periodic Report of Greece Adopted by the Committee at its Fifty Fourth Session (11 February – 1 March 2013), ¶ 6, 
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GRC/CO/7 (Mar. 26, 2013). 
44 Id. ¶ 40.  
45 Černič, supra note 24, at 145.  See European Agency for Dev. in Special Needs Educ. [EADSNE], Teacher 
Education for Inclusion: International Literature Review 28 (2010), available at http://www.european-
agency.org/sites/default/files/TE4I-Literature-Review.pdf. 
46 See Sabine Michalowski, Sovereign Debt and Social Rights–Legal Reflections on a Difficult Relationship, 8(1) 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 35, 68 (2008); Christian Barry, Sovereign Debt, Human Rights, and Policy Conditionality, 19 J. POL. 
PHIL. 282, 284 (2011). 
47  See The Economic Crisis – The EU's Response, EUROPEAN UNION NEWSROOM, 
http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/financial-crisis/index_en.htm (last updated Jan. 21, 2015). 
48 See Jan Sonnenschein, Portugese Trust in Banks Most Bouyant of Bailout Countries, GALLUP (Oct. 4, 2013), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/165245/portuguese-trust-banks-buoyant-bailout-countries.aspx?ref=more. 
49 See Marja Novak, Insight: Slovenia Rues Bank Mismanagement as Bailout Talk Grows, REUTERS (July 26, 2012, 





  As a result of repaying bank losses, governments are not able to guarantee the same 
level of protection of socioeconomic rights due to the repayments limiting their financial capabilities.  Levels of 
socioeconomic rights have therefore declined substantially in most European countries, particularly in Southern, 
Central, and Eastern Europe.
51
  In most cases, no one in the banking sector faced prosecution for approving bad 
loans;
52
 however, taxpayers were forced to accept cuts in social security protection.
53
  National governments 
have therefore been forced to make unpopular choices.  This Section analyzes the corporate obligation to ensure 
respect, protection, and fulfillment of human rights in times of social crisis.   
 
A. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
In the last decade, the UN has intensified its work on business and human rights.  In July of 2005, John 
Ruggie, a professor at Harvard University, was appointed Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General 
on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises.
54
  “Ruggie 
criticized the 2003 Norms and has submitted that the ‘norms exercise became engulfed by its own doctrinal 
excesses.’”
55
  The 2008 Ruggie Report proposed “a three-pillar framework for corporate accountability of 
human rights, which he described as ‘protect, respect[,] and remedy.”
56
  Not long after, the UN Human Rights 
Council adopted the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to create the foundation for 
implementing Ruggie’s three pillars.
57
  After Ruggie's mandate expired in 2011, the UN Human Rights Council 
appointed a five-member working group to “promote the effective and comprehensive dissemination and 
implementation of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
                                                          
50 Id. 
51 See Ian Traynor, Austerity Pushing Europe Into Social and Economic Decline, Says Red Cross, THE GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 10, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/austerity-europe-debt-red-cross. 
52 See Why Have So Few Bankers Gone to Jail for Their Part in the Crisis, THE ECONOMIST, (May 4, 2013), 
available at http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21577064-why-have-so-few-bankers-gone-jail-their-
part-crisis-blind-justice. 
53  See Michael Weissenstein, Retirement at 60? Europe Faced with Cuts in Generous Welfare System, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 24, 2010, 11:57 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/24/europe-cuts-worker-
benefi_n_587209.html. 
54  Press Release, Security-General, Security-General Appoints John Ruggie of United States Special 
Representative on Issue of Human Rights, Transnational Corporations, Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Press Release 
SG/A/934 (July 28, 2005). 
55 Jernej Letnar Černič, United Nations and Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights, 8 MISKOLC J. INT’L L. 23, 
28 (2011) (quoting Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, ¶ 59, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 
(Feb. 2006)). 
56 Id. (quoting Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development: Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business 
and Human Rights, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. A/HR/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008)). 
57 Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Guiding Principles]. 
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‘Protect, Respect[,] and Remedy’ Framework.”
58
  So far, the working group has “produced two reports, which 
have mainly followed Ruggie's mandate.  Both reports were heavily criticized by non-governmental 
organisations and academics.”
59
  “Against this backdrop, in September of 2013, the Republic of Ecuador . . . 
proposed the adoption of ‘[a]n international legally binding instrument, concluded within the UN system, which 
would clarify the obligations of transnational corporations in the field of human rights, as well as of 
corporations in relation to States.’”
60
  The proposal was reportedly supported by eighty-five states and various 
civil society organizations.
61
   
On June 26, 2014, the UN Human Rights Council voted on two resolutions dealing with business and 
human rights.
62
  One resolution was drafted by Ecuador and South Africa and was supported by Bolivia, Cuba, 
and Venezuela, while the other was spearheaded by Norway.
63
  The resolution proposed by Ecuador and South 
Africa created “an open-ended intergovernmental working group on a legally binding instrument on 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights; whose mandate shall be 
to elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the 
activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises.”
64
  The resolution further notes “that the 
Chairperson-Rapporteur of the open-ended intergovernmental Working Group should prepare elements for the 
draft[ing of a] legally binding instrument.”
65
  Even though the resolution moves away from the on-going work 
of the UN regarding business and human rights, twenty states supported it, fourteen voted against it, and thirteen 
states abstained.
66
  An international treaty would “provide appropriate protection, justice[,] and remed[ies] to the 
                                                          
58  Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, Human Rights and the Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, 17th Sess., U.N. Doc, A/HRC/17/L.17/Rev.1, at 2 (June 15, 2011). 
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victims of human rights abuses directly resulting from or related to the activities of some transnational 
corporations and other business[] enterprises.”
67
  Nonetheless,  
As correctly noted by Arvin Ganesan of Human Rights Watch, [] “[a] fundamental flaw lies 
in Ecuador’s insistence that the treaty focus on multinational companies, even though any 
company can cause problems and most standards, including the UN [guiding] principles, 
don’t draw this artificial distinction.”  
 
A day later, Norway’s proposed resolution was adopted consensually. This resolution . . . 
expressed support for ‘the work of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises in the fulfilment of its mandate. . . . 
 
Ruggie noted recently that “the resolution introduced by Argentina, Ghana, Norway, and 
Russia—currently overshadowed by Ecuador’s resolution—will play an important role going 
forward.”
68
   
 
It is understood that both conflicting approaches are often one–dimensional and the most appropriate way 
forward would be to allow for pluralist approaches to the questions of binding and nonbinding initiatives in the 
field of human rights and business.  
 
1. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF CORPORATE OBLIGATIONS 
“Corporations are obliged to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights through a combination of negative and 
positive duties.”
69
  However, “[t]his tripartite typology of human rights obligations normally refers, under 
traditional human rights doctrines, to state obligations.”
70
  However, the fact that the state is the bearer of human 
rights obligations does not imply that only the state has such obligations.
71
  This article argues that corporations 




a. Corporate Obligation to Respect 
The corporate obligation to respect requires “corporations [to] refrain from interfering with the enjoyment 
of human rights . . . .”
73
  This obligation to respect also obliges corporations to effectively recognize the human 
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rights of individuals.  The obligation to respect means that corporations must not only “undertake due diligence 
to ensure not only that they comply with human rights obligations . . . , but also that they do everything possible 
to avoid causing harm . . . .”
74
  More specifically, the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights note in 
Paragraph 11 that corporations “should respect human rights[,] . . . mean[ing] that they should avoid infringing 
on the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.”
75
  
The commentary to Paragraph 12 argues that “[b]ecause business enterprises can have an impact on virtually the 
entire spectrum of internationally recognized human rights, their responsibility to respect applies to all such 
rights.”
76
  In this way, the Guiding Principles do not distinguish between different categories of rights, such as 
civil, political, economic, or social rights.   
Paragraph 11 does not include the word shall, whereas, [John Ruggie’s 2008] report 
recognized that “the baseline responsibility of companies is to respect human rights.”  . . .  In 
contrast, as noted above, several international documents, national legal orders[,] and scholars 
argue that corporations already have human rights obligations.  For instance, the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on [E]xtreme [P]overty state that “business enterprises, have, at 
the very minimum, the responsibility to respect human rights.”  
 
Further, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises noted that both states and 
enterprises that lend to sovereign states “should” respect human rights “within the framework 
of internationally recognised human rights, the international human rights obligations of the 
countries in which they operate,” including domestic human rights obligations.
77
   
 
Whereas the text of the Guidelines employs the verb should, the commentary on the 
Guidelines suggests that enterprises have an obligation to respect human rights because 
“respect for human rights is the global standard of expected conduct for enterprises.”  The 
nature of obligations to respect requires “avoiding infringing on the human rights of others 
and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.”  However, 
[financial] enterprises should only respect human rights “[w]ithin the context of their own 
activities.” They should “[a]void causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts and 
address such impacts when they occur.”  Further, the Guidelines oblige enterprises to conduct 
due diligence “as appropriate to their size, the nature and context of operations[,] and the 
severity of the risks of adverse human rights impacts.”
78
   
 
“Corporations are also obliged to prevent and investigate violations, address complaints brought by victims, and 
potentially provide reparations for harm and injuries caused.”
79
  Overall, corporations are obliged to refrain from 
violating human rights in their activities.  
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b. Corporate Obligation to Protect 
The corporate “obligation to protect human rights [also] includes the obligations to protect the individual’s 
enjoyment of [human] rights . . . and to support the protection of those rights by employing its expertise and 
resources . . . .”
80
  It is these obligations that require the adoption of positive measures to comply with 
socioeconomic rights.  The “[o]bligation to protect means not only that [] corporations must not interfere with 
[human] rights of individuals[,]” but also that “business partners throughout the supply chain” comply with 
them as well.
81
  The Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights do not directly refer to the obligation to 
protect; however, they do refer to it indirectly.  Specifically, they note that  
[t]he responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights applies to all enterprises 
regardless of their size, sector, operational context, ownership and structure.  Nevertheless, 
the scale and complexity of the means through which enterprises meet that responsibility may 





Further, Principle 13(b) notes that corporations shall “seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts 
that are directly linked to their operations, products or services by their business relationships, even if they have 
not contributed to those impacts.”
83
  The obligation to protect generally means that corporations have a duty to 
supervise their supply chains in order to ensure that their suppliers, distributers, and other business partners also 
comply with socioeconomic rights.
84
  In the case of the financial sector, this would mean that transnational 
banks must ensure that both their subsidiaries and local banks comply with socioeconomic rights as well.  
However, this may be difficult to implement in practice.  The measures that corporations can adopt to ensure the 
respect of human rights include acknowledging the human rights in internal policies and codes of conduct, 
constantly and consistently examining human rights situations where human rights are at stake, effectively 
monitoring policies that protect the human rights of individuals, and implementing an effective monitoring 
system to ensure that policies relating to human rights are being implemented.
85
  Another legal source relevant 
to the activities of corporations is the Principles on Responsible Investment, developed by a group of 
international investors.
86
  Further, the Equator Principles Financial Institution provides that it “will not provide 
Project Finance or Project-Related Corporate Loans to Projects where the client will not, or is unable to, comply 
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with the Equator Principles” to ensure that the “projects [they] finance and advise on are developed in a manner 




c. Obligation to Fulfil
88
 
The third category of corporate obligations concerning human rights includes the obligation to 
fulfil, which is defined as a positive obligation.  It is further divided into an obligation to 
facilitate, provide[,] and promote. [However, the obligation truly] depends on the available 
financial resources of the corporation . . . .  It requires that the corporation take[] active 
measures to ensure the availability, accessibility[,] and affordability of [human] rights. 
Corporations are therefore obliged to work towards abolition of obstacles for the enjoyment 
human rights. For instance, the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States 
in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights note in Principle 28, that “[a]ll States 
must take action, separately, and jointly through international cooperation, to fulfil economic, 
social[,] and cultural rights of persons within their territories and extraterritorially . . . .” Such 
obligations apply under the qualifying condition of Principle 31, which argues that “[a] State 
has the obligation to fulfil economic, social[,] and cultural rights in its territory to the 
maximum of its ability.” Mutatis mutandis, the obligation to fulfil . . . would mean that 
financial corporations must contribute to the enjoyment of [human] rights of the individuals . . 
. and strive to abolish obstacles to the enjoyment of economic and human rights. . . .  Another 
way would involve the corporation providing its own financial resources in order to guarantee 
reasonable minimum [human] rights, for instance in a particular geographical area or with 
regard to particular social rights.  However, a reasonable approach should be employed when 
examining the corporate obligation to fulfil [human] rights.  . . . [C]orporations are not 
expected to take the role of the state, but are expected to do what they can. States are, and 
should be, primarily responsible to meet this obligation.  However, a corporation, such as 
Royal Dutch Shell in Ogoniland, may become the primary holder of an obligation to fulfil 
economic rights in the context of a failed state where there is no governmental control or no 
efficient authority to protect [human] rights and where corporations were asked to provide 
public functions on behalf of the state.
89
   
 
In such cases, a corporation might have assumed the role of the state, thereby assuming the state’s obligations as 
well.  A corporation may assume some of these obligations where the state is not present and can no longer 
guarantee human rights, provided that the corporation has stepped in to the role of the state.
90
   
The size and availability of corporate financial resources will play a large role in meeting 
these standards to protect [human] rights.  While the resources available for fulfilling human 
rights obligations may not be as plentiful in small corporations as in large corporations, 
corporations may adopt such policies to the maximum extent given their available resources. 
Given the above, such obligations also have implications beyond the legal sphere into the 
field of ethical and moral obligations.   
 
This section has shown that corporations have tripartite obligations to respect, protect[,] and 
fulfil the reasonable minimum core of economic and social rights of individuals in the 
borrowing state.  
III.  STATE OBLIGATIONS UNDER SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS 
                                                          
87  About the Equator Principles, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/ep3/38-
about/about/195 (last visited Jan. 22, 2015). 
88 This portion of the Article draws heavily from Černič, supra note 24, at 155–56. 
89 Černič, supra note 24, at 155–56 (internal citations omitted).   
90 See THE ESSEX BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, CORPORATE LIABILITY IN A NEW SETTING: SHELL & THE 
CHANGING LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR THE MULTINATIONAL OIL INDUSTRY IN THE NIGER DELTA 60 (2012). 
101 
 
A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 
States have primary obligations to ensure that socioeconomic rights are well protected.  Traditionally, states 
are obliged to protect human rights within their territory.  This Section therefore first examines obligations of 
territorial states in relation to economic and social rights.   
The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) provides in 
Article 2(1) that states shall undertake “steps, individually and through international 
assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its 
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the 
adoption of legislative measures.” This provision includes the most common characteristics of 
economic and social rights, including that their full realization is to be achieved progressively 
depending on the state’s available financial resources.
91
   
However, it is more common for states to attempt to conceal the real state of the public budget in order to avoid 
their obligations regarding socioeconomic rights. 
 
Figure 3: Characteristics of socioeconomic rights  
 
However, the phrase “maximum available resources”
92
 refers not only to a state’s financial capabilities, but 
also to the international community’s obligations of “international assistance and cooperation.”
93
  “Positive 
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obligations under economic and social rights are most often connected with financial resources.  Therefore, 
insisting on the immediate realization of the core of economic and social rights in every situation may impose 
unjustified burdens on states that have been facing systematic and long-term public resource shortages[,]”
94
 
especially during economic and financial crises.
95
  “For instance, some states and even some corporations can 
provide free elementary education, whereas others . . . must charge for attending primary school simply due to a 
lack of available public financial resources.”
96
  This is of course despite the fact that  
charging fees is often counterproductive and that the obligation to provide free education falls 
within the core obligations under the ICESCR and is therefore not dependent on available 
resources. Some commentators claim that international human rights law therefore 
traditionally places only obligations of conduct on states, not obligations of result.  However, 
the views of the ESCR Committee and scholarship on immediate obligations of result 
challenge such an assumption.
97
  
Economic and social rights have long time been considered as secondary and even nowadays 
in practice both sets of rights are still not placed on an equal footing.  Economic, social[,] and 
cultural rights include rights to housing, food, education, water[,] and health. This set of rights 
complements the so-called civil and political rights.  As Scheinin notes, “[T]here is no water-
tight division between different categories of human rights.”  However, despite claims that 
both sets of rights are of equal importance and are interdependent, civil and political rights are 
more solidly established under international and national law.  Economic [and social] rights 
generally have a programmatic nature and are not always directly justiciable to the same 
extent that civil and political rights are.
98
   
 
Even though an extensive body of case law has come to existence in relation to civil and political rights, courts 
are still very reluctant to try cases based on economic, social, or cultural rights.
99
  This refers to the question of 
the “justiciability” of economic, social, and cultural rights, and whether these rights are enforceable before a 
court of law.
100
  Sisay Yeshanew, an international law scholar,  
[D]efines justiciable rights as those that can “be subjected to a judicial or quasi-judicial 
procedure of enforcement.”  [However,] Scheinin argues that “[t]he problem relating to the 
legal nature of economic and social rights does not relate to their validity but rather to their 
applicability.”  The central question of economic and social rights therefore lies in their 
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enforcement or justiciability.  [] [T]he Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, entered into force on May 5, 2013, [recognizes] the 
political acceptance by [signatory] states of their justiciability.
101
   
 
Furthermore, the European Committee of Social Rights has been examining increasing numbers of collective 
complaints.
102
  In addition, the body of case law in domestic jurisdictions is growing substantially as well.
103
 
The CESCR developed the conceptual baseline for economic and social rights in which every individual 
should enjoy.  It argued that 
 
A minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential 
levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party.  Thus, for example, a State party 
in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential 
primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, prima 
facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant.  If the Covenant were to be read in 





 The minimum core model requires states to ensure basic levels of compliance in relation to a right.  
Historically, this has not been the usual case with economic and social rights, but it almost immediately (or with 
immediate effect) became a common feature of economic and social rights.
105
  Nonetheless, the CESCR 
cautions state parties “to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal.”
106
  However, 
defining the minimum level of a right in a particular country is even more problematic.  The CESCR “lacks 
concrete standards for evaluating the performance of governments and their compliance with the Covenant,” and 
therefore, “it should come as no surprise that the Committee itself does not use progressive realization as the 
standard by which it reviews the performance of states parties.”
107
  Additionally, courts and human rights bodies 
may easily employ the minimum core model to identify minimum levels of negative obligations, as their 
applicability is questionable in relation to positive obligations.
108
  In applying this principle, the minimum core 
approach applies particularly to obligations to respect and protect economic and social rights, and to a lesser 
extent, to fulfill obligations that involve financial resources of a state.  
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 However, as noted above, the phrase “maximum of its available resources”
109
 refers to both the financial 
capability of a state as well as the international community.
110
  Therefore, seeking expeditious implementation 
of economic and social rights can encumber states already experiencing resource shortages.
111
  This shortage of 
resources and pressure to recognize new rights could cause a state to not have the ability to fulfill minimum 
rights that could have been fulfilled under other circumstances.  For instance, a state which cannot ensure basic 
health care, housing, or education to a majority of its population cannot expect to provide an individual with 
life-saving drugs, a social flat, or free education.
112
  For this reason, it is more convincing and appropriate to 
employ and interpret the minimum core model together with a “reasonableness test” drafted by the South-
African Constitutional Court in Grootboom
113
 and subsequent cases.
114
  The Court eloquently stated in 
Grootboom that 
[t]hey must, however, ensure that the measures they adopt are reasonable.  In any challenge 
based on section 26 in which it is argued that the state has failed to meet the positive 
obligations imposed upon it by section 26(2), the question will be whether the legislative and 
other measures taken by the state are reasonable.  A court considering reasonableness will not 
enquire whether other more desirable or favourable measures could have been adopted, or 
whether public money could have been better spent.  The question would be whether the 
measures that have been adopted are reasonable.  It is necessary to recognise that a wide range 
of possible measures could be adopted by the state to meet its obligations.  Many of these 




The state policies to implement economic and social rights under the jurisprudence of the South African Court 
of Human Rights must be reasonable.  The following figure illustrates the concept of a reasonable minimum 
core: 
                                                          
109 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 92, at art. 1, ¶ 1. 
110 General Comment No: 3, supra note 93, at ¶ 13.  See Sepúlveda, supra note 93, at 352. 
111 See Černič, supra note 24, at 152.   
112 See Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom and Others 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) at ¶ 46 (S. Afr.); Carol Steinberg, 
Can Reasonableness Protect the Poor? A Review of South Africa's Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence, 123 S. AFR. L. J. 
264, 268–71 (2006). 
113 Grootboom (1) SA 1 (CC) at ¶ 46. 
114 See Mazibuko and Others v. City of Johannesburg and Others 2009 (1) SA 1 (CC) at ¶¶ 93–97 (S. Afr.).  The 
Court stated, “What is clear from the conduct of the City is that it has progressively sought to increase access to water for 
larger households who are prejudiced by the 6 kilolitre limit.  It has continued to review its policy regularly and undertaken 
sophisticated research to seek to ensure that it meets the needs of the poor within the city.  It cannot therefore be said that the 
policy adopted by the City was inflexible, and the applicants’ argument on this score too must fail.”  Id. at ¶ 97.  See also 
Nokotyana and Others v. Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality and Others 2009 (1) SA 1 (CC) at 23 (S. Afr.); Etienne 
Mureinik, Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution, 8 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 464, 473 (1992). 




Figure 4: The concept of reasonable minimum core of socioeconomic rights  
However, such an approach also has quite a few disadvantages, one being nontransparent state policy.  A 
policy could be deemed as reasonable by the state and reverse the burden of proof, which would cause 
difficulties in showing that state policy was in fact unreasonable in an international tribunal.
116
  Therefore, a 
combination of both approaches can overcome these deficiencies.
117
   
Yeshanew observes that the minimum core model “more or less concentrates on the content 
of the rights to identify minimum obligations,” while the reasonableness test “focuses on the 
obligations of states or measures to realize rights.”  The two-tiered approach can effectively 
address deficiencies of both approaches.  In the same way, courts and human rights bodies can 
apply such an approach toward negative and positive obligations under social and economic 
rights.
118
   
 
“The concept of a reasonable minimum core identifies minimum core obligations to respect, protect[,] and fulfil 
economic and social rights.”
119
  It has been illustrated that an economic crisis often affects the ability of a state 




B. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE OBLIGATIONS DURING ECONOMIC CRISIS 
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The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) monitors the forty-seven member states of the Council of 
Europe for compliance with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR), whereas the Committee of Ministers supervises the execution of ECtHR judgments in 
domestic jurisdictions.
121
  The ECHR has been defined as a “constitutional instrument of the European public 
order.”
122
  Judge Jambrek described it in the same way in his concurring opinion in the case Fischer v. 
Austria.
123
  The ECtHR can therefore be viewed as a European constitutional court.  Regarding the protection of 
human rights, the ECHR system is one of the most efficient and effective in the world.  The ECHR lays out ten 
fundamental human rights, and it was the first binding treaty that specifically addressed human rights when it 
came into force in 1953.
124
  The court in Tyrer v. United Kingdom described the ECHR as “a living instrument 
which . . . must be interpreted in light of present-day conditions.”
125
  Although the wording of the ECHR only 
protects civil and political rights, the ECtHR has repeatedly held that the ECHR indirectly protects most of the 
economic and social human rights as well.
126
 
The judges of the ECtHR both interpret and develop the articles of the ECHR.
127
  They 
formulate the content of the ECHR through a “living process” in their judgments and in 
separate concurring and dissenting opinions. The ECHR is a normative document for the 
protection of human rights with maximum legal value and force, but it is also a political 
document that contains a number of [open] legal concepts.  Such legal concepts can be 





It is therefore essential to present and analyze the role of the ECtHR in protecting socioeconomic rights.  The 
Court hearing the 1978 case of Airey v Ireland remarked, 
[T]he further [realization] of social and economic rights is largely dependent on the 
situation—notably financial—reigning in the State in question.  On the other hand, the 
Convention must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions . . . and it is designed to 
safeguard the individual in a real and practical way as regards those areas with which it deals.  
Whilst the Convention sets forth what are essentially civil and political rights, many of them 
have implications of a social or economic nature.  The Court therefore considers, like the 
Commission, that the mere fact that an interpretation of the Convention may extend into the 
sphere of social and economic rights should not be a decisive factor against such an 
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The Court has previously examined several problematic issues relating to the enjoyment of socioeconomic 
rights, specifically where it has recognized the difference between socioeconomic, civil, and political rights, 
with the former depending almost entirely on the availability of financial resources.
130
  The Court further 
observed in Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy that “[t]he economic crisis and recent social and political changes 
have had a particular impact on certain regions of Africa and the Middle East, throwing up new challenges for 
European States in terms of immigration control.”
131
  
 Recent case law from the ECtHR concerning human rights and the economic crisis is, however, quite 
telling.  Ever mindful of the difficult financial positions of most European governments, the ECtHR granted 
those governments, in most cases, a wide margin to lower the standards of socioeconomic rights, while still 
maintaining a respect for their reasonable core.  For instance, the ECtHR observed in Da Conceição Mateus 
v. Portugal and Santos Januário v. Portugal,  
As it recently did in similar circumstances relating to austerity measures adopted in Greece, . . . 
the Court considers that the cuts in social security benefits provided by the 2012 State Budget 
Act were clearly in the public interest within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.  Like in 





The ECtHR found that a decrease in the salaries of public officials does not amount to unjustified violations of 
socioeconomic rights.
133
  Therefore, it declared the complaint inadmissible, explaining that “in the light of the 
exceptional economic and financial crisis faced by Portugal at the material time and given the limited extent and 
the temporary effect of the reduction of their holiday and Christmas subsidies, the Court considers that the 
applicants did not bear a disproportionate and excessive burden.”
134
  The economic crisis rendered the 
Portuguese government unable to financially maintain the privileges of public employees.
135
  Similarly, in 
Koufaki and Adedy v. Greece, the ECtHR agreed with the Supreme Administrative Court, which “held that the 
fact that the cuts in wages and pensions were not merely temporary was justified, since the legislature’s aim had 
been not only to remedy the acute budgetary crisis at that time but also to consolidate the State’s finances on a 
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  Here again the availability of financial resources was at stake, but the court held, “Provided 
that the legislature remains within the bounds of its margin of appreciation, it is not for the Court to say whether 
the legislation represented the best solution for dealing with the problem or whether the legislature’s discretion 
should have been exercised in another way.”
137
  Furthermore, concerning redundancy payout, the ECtHR held in 
N.K.M. v Hungary, 
In the Court’s view, the applicant, together with a group of dismissed civil servants . . . , was 
made to bear an excessive and disproportionate burden, while other civil servants with 
comparable statutory and other benefits were apparently not required to contribute to a 
comparable extent to the public burden, even if they were in the position of leadership that 
enabled them to define certain contractual benefits potentially disapproved by the public.  
Moreover, the Court observes that the legislature did not afford the applicant a transitional period 




Against this background, the Court finds that the measure complained of entailed an excessive 
and individual burden on the applicant’s side.  This is all the more evident when considering the 
fact that the measure targeted only a certain group of individuals, who were apparently singled 
out by the public administration in its capacity as employer.  Assuming that the impugned 
measure served the interest of the State budget at a time of economic hardship, the Court notes 





It would therefore go on to conclude,  
[T]he specific measure in question, as applied to the applicant, even if meant to serve social 
justice, cannot be justified by the legitimate public interest relied on by the Government.  It 
affected the applicant (and other dismissed civil servants in a similar situation) being in good-
faith standing and deprived her of the larger part of a statutorily guaranteed, acquired right 
serving the special social interest of reintegration.  In the Court’s opinion, those who act in good 
faith on the basis of law should not be frustrated in their statute-based expectations without 
specific and compelling reasons.  Therefore the measure cannot be held reasonably proportionate 




Because of this ruling, the ECtHR thus far has not found austerity measures to be in violation of the ECHR, as 
states have been given a wide margin to determine an individual’s socioeconomic rights in accordance with the 
available financial resources of the state.  However, states still must exercise diligent care to not infringe on the 
core of socioeconomic rights. 
States have positive obligations to ensure respect of individual’s socioeconomic rights.  For instance, in his 
concurring opinion in Guerra and Others v. Italy, regarding the operation of the Italian government, which 
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failed to inform the population of the possibility of potential environmental pollution by a factory, Judge P. 
Jambrek noted that states have a positive obligation to inform residents of potential environmental risks.  He 
remarked, 
I am therefore of the opinion that such a positive obligation should be considered as dependent 
upon the following condition: that those who are potential victims of the industrial hazard have 
requested that specific information, evidence, tests, etc., be made public and be communicated to 
them by a specific government agency.  If the government did not comply with such a request, 
and gave no good reasons for not complying, then such a failure should be considered equivalent 




In his concurring opinion, Judge P. Jambrek proceeded from the application of the law and a broad 
understanding of the rights protected by the ECHR, stressing that states have both negative and positive 
obligations in the implementation of the ECHR.
142
  States have to take measures to ensure that the reasonable 
core of socioeconomic rights will be respected not only between the individual and the state but also between 
private actors.  
 
C. THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER AND STATE OBLIGATIONS DURING ECONOMIC CRISIS 
At the regional level, the European Social Charter provides the only quasi-judicial complaint mechanism 
for enforcing economic and social rights.
143
  The Charter offers only the right to lodge collective complaints, 
while the European Social Rights Committee issues only non-binding recommendations.
144
  However, the 
European Committee of Social Rights has previously developed extensive case law stemming from collective 
complaints arising from the economic crisis.
145
  From these complaints, it has confirmed that the state shall 
guarantee the enjoyment of economic and social rights.
146
  In 2009, the Committee noted,  
. . . [T]he economic crisis should not have as a consequence the reduction of the protection of 
the rights recognised by the Charter.  Hence, the governments are bound to take all necessary 
steps to ensure that the rights of the Charter are effectively guaranteed at a period of time 
when beneficiaries most need protection.
147
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Such a pronouncement follows the principle of non-retrogression deriving from the CESCR.
148
  The European 
Social Rights Committee also dealt with the issue of socioeconomic rights in times of crisis in decisions 
stemming from collective complaints.
149
  For instance, the European Committee of Social Rights explained in 
GENOP-DEI and ADEDY v. Greece that spending cuts due to the crisis “should not excessively destabilise the 
situation of those who enjoy the rights enshrined in the Charter.”
150
  It mentioned “stability,” which refers to the 
idea that states should not offer a lower standard of protection if stable individuals would be harmed.  It further 
noted that “a greater employment flexibility . . . should not result in depriving broad categories of employees, 
particularly those who have not had a stable job for long, of their fundamental rights in the field of labor law, 
protecting them from arbitrary decisions by their employers or from economic fluctuations.”
151
  The Committee 
further held that “doing away with such guarantees would not only force employees to shoulder an excessively 
large share of the consequences of the crisis but also accept pro-cyclical effects liable to make the crisis worse 
and to increase the burden on welfare systems.”
152
  In a similar decision against Greece, the Committee 
emphasized that that any spending cuts “should not undermine the core framework of a national social security 
system or deny individuals the opportunity to enjoy the protection it offers against serious social and economic 
risk.”
153
   
Such reasoning mirrors the minimum core concept of the CESCR, albeit without including the 
reasonableness test.  The European Social Rights Committee further elaborated on economic and social rights in 
five other complaints against Greece, where it adopted the combination of the minimum core approach and 
reasonableness test when determining state compliance with economic and social rights obligations.
154
  In IKA-
ETAM v. Greece, the Committee held, 
. . . [E]ven when reasons pertaining to the economic situation of a state party make it impossible 
for a state to maintain their social security system at the level that it had previously attained, it is 
necessary . . . for that state party to maintain the social security system on a satisfactory level that 
takes into account the legitimate expectations of beneficiaries of the system and the right of all 




The Committee does not require a state party to maintain an equal level of rights during times of crisis.  During 
those periods, the Committee takes a more cautious, reasonable, and human approach when analyzing the 
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difficulties faced by governments.  Nonetheless, the Committee held against Greece by finding, “[T]he 
Government has not conducted the minimum level of research and analysis into the effects of such far-reaching 




“[S]tates often invoke [the country’s creditworthiness] in order to justify the adoption of the austerity 
measures” that curtail economic and social rights enjoyed by citizens.
157
  In a lending agreement between two 
private actors, the “debtor would be obliged to repay her debt to the creditor, unless she declares insolvency” 
and is subsequently granted relief.
158
   
In a sovereign financing context, a state is also liable to repay its debt to its creditor, being 
another state, international organisation[,] or corporation.  However, states are often faced with 
multiple obligations they need to address.  What is more, the most equitable ranking of 
payment obligations is often difficult to determine.  As Dowell-Jones and Kinley aptly noted, 
“[H]uman rights are intimately tied up with the economic health of the state, as well as, of 




In seeking policy guidelines that account for these realities, a dilemma arises:  When a state’s obligations to 
creditors come into conflict with the state’s ability to provide a minimum standard of economic and social 
welfare, which priority should take precedence?  The delayed implementation of already agreed upon austerity 
measures illustrates the difficulties encountered by many states in balancing these two conflicting priorities.
160
  
States want to keep their sovereign debt obligations from “undermin[ing] the protection of economic and social 
human rights, and must consider whether the protection of fundamental human rights may impede the 
repayment of, or terminate, state sovereign debt obligations.”
161
  To help states balance these priorities, the 
CESCR has provided the following instruction: 
In order for a State party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum core 
obligations to a lack of available resources it must demonstrate that every effort has been made 





The precise meaning of “every effort” remains unclear.  Either way, states must show their willingness to meet 
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their debt obligations in order to retain access to international credit markets.
163
  
  “Traditionally, the protection of human rights has always concentrated on balancing the interests of the 
individual with those of society as whole, which include its international obligations to repay its debt to 
creditors.”
164
  Some argue that requiring states to repay debts that were used to support oppressive regimes 
amounts to a violation of economic and social rights.
165
  This would call for a middle-ground approach that 
strikes a balance between the economic and social rights of individuals and the rights of international creditors, 
but such a solution is often difficult to achieve.  Nevertheless, the current “practice of financial market[] 
[participants] and investment arbitration panels illustrates that economic and social rights are not only 
[underappreciated,] but that they do not play any slightly significant role” in negotiations at all.
166
  “However, it 
is argued that the reasonable minimum core of [] human right[s] . . . is untouchable.”
167
  Scholars argue that “in 
the context of [economic crises], “states are obliged to non-discriminately provide at least a reasonable 
minimum core of economic and social rights[,]” and the issue of whether this conflicts with the state’s debt 
obligations is “a false dilemma.”
168
  Similarly, Kunibert Raffer  
argues that “the right of creditors to interest and repayments collides and the principle 
recognized generally (not only in the case of loans) by all civilized legal systems that no one 
must be forced to fulfil contracts if that leads to inhumane distress, endangers one’s life or 
health, or violates human dignity.” All in all, states . . . must guarantee at least the reasonable 





IV. EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS OF HOME STATES OF CORPORATIONS
170 
Territorial states have an obligation to ensure the protection of one’s enjoyment of human rights via the 
tripartite obligation to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights.  This article advances the argument that home 
states have an obligation to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights within and outside a national context.  Such 
obligations therefore provide strong evidence that home countries should enforce laws against human rights 
violations that their corporations perpetrate abroad.  Rather weakly, Ruggie’s Guiding Principles assert that 
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“states should set out clearly the expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or 
jurisdiction respect human rights throughout their operations.”
171
  In his commentary, he writes, “At present[,] 
States are not generally required under international human rights law to regulate the extraterritorial activities of 
businesses domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction.  Nor are they generally prohibited from doing so, 
provided there is a recognized jurisdictional basis.”
172
  However, the idea that states also have extraterritorial 
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights is gradually becoming the consensus view.
173
  David 
Kinley has argued for international and domestic pressure on home states to fill the enforcement gap left by 
foreign countries with more relaxed regulatory schemes.
174
  The European Court of Human Rights noted in 
Kovačič v. Slovenia that “acts of the Slovenian authorities continue to produce effects, albeit outside Slovenian 
territory, such that Slovenia's responsibility under the Convention could be engaged.”
175
  Extraterritorial human 
rights obligations of home states therefore arise in the commission of acts or omissions by its authorities to 




 Such reasoning is supported by the general comments and concluding observations of state reports of 
international human rights bodies.  The CESCR has authoritatively expressed in its 2011 statement that “States 
Parties should also take steps to prevent human rights contraventions abroad by corporations which have their 
main seat under their jurisdiction, without infringing the sovereignty or diminishing the obligations of the host 
States under the Covenant.”
177
  The Committee further noted that “States Parties home to companies active 
abroad shall also encourage such companies to assist, as appropriate, including in situations of armed conflict 
and natural disaster, host States in building capacities needed to address the corporate responsibility for the 
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observance of economic, social[,] and cultural rights.”
178
  The same Committee observed in its General 
Comment No. 14 concerning the right to health, “States parties have to respect the enjoyment of the right to 
health in other countries, and to prevent third parties from violating the right in other countries, if they are able 
to influence these third parties by way of legal or political means . . . .”
179
  Similarly, it noted in its General 
Comment No. 15: The Right to Water, “International cooperation requires States parties to refrain from actions 
that interfere, directly or indirectly, with the enjoyment of the right to water in other countries.”
180
  Further, the 
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has noted in its General Comment No. 16,  
Home States also have obligations, arising under the CRC and its protocols, to respect, 
protect[,] and fulfil children’s rights in the context of businesses' extraterritorial activities and 
operations provided that there is a reasonable link between the State and the conduct 
concerned.  A reasonable link exists when a business enterprise has its centre of activity, is 





Additionally, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has also noted the following in its 
report on the United Kingdom: 
[T]he State party should ensure that no obstacles are introduced in the law that prevent the 
holding of such transnational corporations accountable in the State party’s courts when such 
violations are committed outside the State party.  The Committee reminds the State party to 




The Committee also made similar observations regarding Australia, Canada, and the United States.
183
  Such 
statements and comments illustrate that international human rights organizations recognize that home states 
have extraterritorial obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights of individuals against corporate 
violations abroad.  These extraterritorial obligations also derive from various national laws on reporting and 
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  Several stock exchanges demand assurances on human rights before companies are permitted 
to list on the stock exchange.  For instance, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange rules provide that a mineral 
company must, inter alia, inform about “project risks arising from environmental, social, and health and safety 
issues.”
185
  These extraterritorial obligations appear to suggest that states must undertake due diligence to ensure 
that they not only comply with a basic minimum standard of human rights, but also that they do everything 
reasonably possible to avoid human rights violations abroad.
186
  A state’s obligation to protect is a duty of 
conduct and requires the state to adopt protective measures that help prevent human rights violations by its 
corporations overseas.
187
  The home state may also be expected to protect against corporate violations when host 
states may be unable or unwilling to effectively control the activities of corporations when they interfere with 
human rights.
188
  An extraterritorial state may become the main party responsible to prevent human rights 
violations by its corporate actors in a failed state, especially where there is no efficient governmental control or 
authority.  This may be the only way to protect human rights in these areas.  
 
V. SOME PREDICTIONS 
In recent years, Europe has experienced a deep economic and social crisis that has led to the erosion of 
democratic values.  This has been characterized by a lack of transparency in decision-making at the highest 
levels of government.  Can the recent financial crisis really destroy the social advances that European societies 
have made in the last few decades?  Either way, the crisis can certainly undermine the foundations of European 
integration.  The spirit of European unity and cohesion that arose after the shocking experiences of the Second 
World War is almost no longer present.  It is not too far-fetched to suggest that the future of the European and 
global economy is in danger.  We are facing crucial decisions about how European societies should manage 
interactions between rule of law, democracy, and human rights.  If national governments will be unable to 
provide basic public services in education, health, culture, and social security, social tensions should be 
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expected to grow.  The protests against government austerity measures in Greece and Spain would likely be 
only the first harbingers of the social unrest, which would be expected in the majority of European countries if 
the worst-case scenario were realized.  
The fear of repeating past mistakes should be sufficient for both Northern and Southern European countries 
to agree on a long-term solution for the European economy.  Economic cooperation is not only a key factor in 
further integrating the continent; it is the linchpin that allows all other sectors of society to function.  Currently, 
the European society seems to have reversed its trend of further integration and has regressed towards increasing 
isolationism.  However, a solution to the seemingly hopeless situation has long been known: The Euro area must 
establish a fiscal and banking union.  Joint European authorities that oversee the fiscal and banking policies of 
each member state should govern the union.  Such measures could help gradually reduce, and later prevent, the 
glaring public debts of the Eurozone’s southern members.  The calm before the storm will not last forever, and it 
would be naive to hope that the storm will avoid Northern Europe.  The fact that the storm has already 
commenced in Southern Europe should be sufficient for authorities to take action.  If no action is taken, the 
storm will likely have enough force to shake the social pillars of European society, which were erected over 
decades of painstaking effort.  The continent can only emerge from its current predicament through prudent 
management of public finances, while highlighting and strengthening the fundamental values of the European 
enlightenment, accountability, and democracy. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
Discussion of socioeconomic rights during times of economic crisis is often shaped by deeply rooted 
emotions that suppress argumentative dialogue and reasoning, which has led to European societies becoming 
increasingly polarized.  There are no simple answers to the fundamental questions raised by the European debt 
crisis.  In seeking answers to these questions, states and corporations must be careful not to undermine 
socioeconomic rights and the pluralistic democratic process.  This article has attempted to argue that states and 
corporations should employ a reasonable minimum standard approach when examining potential violations of 
socioeconomic rights.  Additionally, courts should strike a better balance by assessing the real level of threat to 
the democratic order represented by austerity measures and by protecting fundamental human rights and 
freedoms. 
The enjoyment of economic and social rights is crucial for the survival and well-being of individuals. States 
and corporations have obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil these rights, and thus should be held to observe a 
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reasonable minimum standard of socioeconomic well-being.  This minimum standard should apply not only to 
restructuring pre-existing negotiations, but also before anything is borrowed in the first place.   
The aim of this article was to examine the obligations of states and corporations as to the economic and 
social rights of individuals.  While one can more easily conclude that states have domestic obligations to 
respect, protect, and fulfil a reasonable minimum standard of economic and social rights, the idea that those 
obligations extend extraterritorially is not as straightforward.  States and corporations must be held accountable 
when they fail to maintain a minimum standard of economic and social rights.  If Eastern and Southern 
European states are unable to provide a reasonable minimum standard of economic and social rights, then a duty 
must arise on the part of more developed home states to verify that their corporations are observing a minimum 
standard in their overseas operations.  Ordinary people in Eastern and Southern Europe should not be used as 
sacrificial lambs to atone for the mismanagement of public and private banking officials.  The equitable solution 
would provide that states and corporations must observe a reasonable minimum standard of economic and social 
rights in their efforts to confront the obstacles facing the Eurozone.  
